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Abstract
The empirical analyses show that public and private R&D are strongly
intertwined. On the one hand, the existence of large direct spillovers from
public R&D to private industry has extensively proven. Yet, both a sub-
stitutability and complementarity relationship between private and public
R&D investment has been found. From an institutional point of view, to
stimulate the technology transfer from public R&D to private industry
the U.S. adopted an uniform patent policy for public funded research,
such as that guaranteed by the Bayh-Dole Act. This paper contributes to
explain this empirical evidence. Within a neo-Schumpeterian endogenous
growth model, it is shown that the intellectual appropriation share of a
new commercial valuable idea by private ﬁrms and the subsidy of private
R&D cost are two equivalent ways to stimulate private R&D eﬀort, and
they aﬀect in the same way the endogenous per capita output growth rate.
The existence of a trade oﬀ between the per capita output growth rate and
level has found. The main policy implication of these results consists into
guarantee two diﬀerent regimes of IPR for industrial and public innova-
tions. Furthermore, it is shown that the large direct spillovers from public
R&D to private industry allows to have better growth performance even
if public R&D investment crowds out private innovative eﬀort. Again a
trade oﬀ between the per capita output growth rate and level has found.
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Private and Public R&D,
Growth
JEL classiﬁcation: O31, O34, O38
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The role of the technological progress and of the Research and Development
(R&D) investments for the growth performance of a country is emphasized by
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1both academic and non-academic analyses. In several developed countries both
private and public institutions invest large amounts of resources in R&D (see the
National Science Foundation reports). In such countries intellectual property
rights (IPR) - often in the form of a patents - have granted at the oﬀsprings of the
R&D eﬀort. Since the ’80s the U.S. adopted several legislative and institutional
arrangements to reinforce the ties between public and private R&D, and to
spur the technology transfer of discoveries and inventions from public research
to private industry. Among the several legislative acts the most inﬂuential has
been the Bayh-Dole Act of the 1980. This Act instituted an uniform federal
patent policy for universities and small businesses under which they obtained
the rights to any patents resulting from grants and contracts funded by any
federal agency and to licence these patents on an exclusive or non-exclusive
basis.1 Based on the belief that legislative arrangements such as the Bayh-
Dole Act enhance the technology transfer and the academic contributions to
innovation and growth in the U.S., similar legislation is being considered in
other OECD countries (OECD, 2002).
The existence of interrelations between public and private R&D is also
proven by the empirical evidence. The empirical analyses show that private
ﬁrms beneﬁt of large spillovers from public discoveries and innovations (direct
spillovers), whatever is their eﬀect on the private innovative eﬀort. Narin et al.
(1997), and McMillan et al. (2000) show that, for the U.S. industry, relying in
external sources of knowledge centers on public science. In particular, Narin
et al. (1997) show that during the 1993-1994, 73% of the scientiﬁcp a p e rc i t e d
by U.S. industrial patents were ﬁrm public science sources. From a theoretical
point of view these spillovers are explained both through the intrinsic nature
of knowledge as a nonrival input (see Arrow 1962) and the Merton’s issue of
priority of scientiﬁcd i s c o v e r i e s . 2
Furthermore, some empirical analyses study the eﬀect of public R&D in-
vestment in stimulating private research eﬀort. Recently, David et al. (2000)
also ﬁnd the existence of large and direct spillovers from public R&D to private
industry, and the same authors maintain that these spillovers “...often are held
to enhance private sector productive capabilities, and, speciﬁcally, to encour-
age applied R&D investments by ﬁrms that lead to technological innovations
- from which will ﬂow future streams of producer and consumer surpluses.”3
1Others legislative acts in such direction are the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innova-
tion Act of the (1980), the Small Business Innovation Development Act (1982), the National
Cooperative Research Act (1984), the Federal Technology Transfer Act (1986), the National
Cooperative Research and Production Act (1993), the Technology Transfer and Commercial-
ization Act (2000).
2Merton (1973) argued that - within the non market rewards structure - the goal of sci-
entists is to establish the priority of discovery by being the ﬁrst to announce an advance in
knowledge. Therefore, the rewards to priority are the recognition awarded by the scientiﬁc
community for being the ﬁrst.
3The same authors maintain: “Several recent econometric studies, for example, document
positive, statistically signiﬁcant ‘spillovers’ eﬀects via the stimulation of private R&D invest-
ment by publicly funded additions to the stock of scientiﬁc knowledge.” See also Leyden
and Link (1991). Other macro empirical works that show the existence of complementarity
between publicly funded R&D and private R&D are Levy (1990), Robson (1993), Diamond
2Yet, this complementarity relationship between public and private R&D invest-
ments is not general, in fact the empirical analysis also shows the existence of a
substitutability relationship between private and public R&D investment.4
Therefore, the empirical evidence shows that private and public R&D eﬀorts
are strictly intertwined. The existence of large direct spillovers from public
R&D to private industry has extensively proven. Yet, a clear substitutability-
complementarity relationship between public and private research eﬀort is not
proven. Moreover, the institutional set-up of a country in the form of IPR can
aﬀect the ties between private and public R&D.
This paper considers these interrelations, and it sheds light to explain the
empirical evidence mentioned above. To this aim a neo-Schumpeterian growth
framework à la Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998), and Howitt (1999, 2000) is
adopted. The neo-Schumpeterian growth literature considers innovation, knowl-
edge accumulation, and technological progress as the engines of the economic
growth. In large part of the neo-Schumpeterian literature policy consists into
guarantee patent protection at the private innovative ﬁrms and to subsidize their
R&D cost, without any direct presence of the government in the R&D sector.5
The patent-design literature, on the other hand, addresses the question of how
does patent policy aﬀect incentives for industrial R&D. Recently, O’Donoghue
and Zweimuller (2004) extend the patent-design literature to a general equilib-
rium framework. However, also these authors only pay attention at the eﬀect
on the industrial R&D.
This paper distinguishes in the description of the R&D sector, where both the
private and public sectors invest in R&D. In this framework the industrial sector
can conduct both the basic and development stage of the R&D activity,6 while
the public sector invests in basic research. Because the empirical evidence shows
that the development stage is the prominent activity of the private research
eﬀort,7 the drastic, yet realistic, assumption that public R&D only consists in
(1998), Von Tunzelmann and Martin (1998).
4David et al. (2000) remark that empirical evidence on public R&D as complement or sub-
stitute for private R&D is not conclusive; in fact the authors maintain: “...available empirical
evidence on the issue remains rather short of being conclusive, to say at least.”
5The theoretical conclusions are not univocal. Some theoretical and empirical analyses
conclude that policy has positive eﬀect on both per capita output growth rate and on per
capita output level. The alternative view concludes that policy is ineﬀective on per-capita
output growth rate, even if it can produce positive eﬀects on the per capita output level (see
Jones 1995, 1999). Although a recent empirical analysis by Ha and Howitt (2006) seems to
consider public policy eﬀective even on the per capita growth rate of countries, a conclusive
result, both theoretical and empirical, can not be again obtained.
6The Science and Engineering Indicators (SEI, 2006) by the National Science Foundation
deﬁnes as basic the research aimed “to gain more comprehensive knowledge or understanding
of the subject under study without speciﬁc application in minds”. The development stage
is deﬁned as “the systematic use of the knowledge or understanding gained from research
directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, systems, or methods, including
the design and development of prototypes and processes.”
7The SEI states: “The federal government, estimated to have found 61,8% of U.S. basic re-
search in 2004, has historically been the primary source of support for basic research...Industry
devoted only an estimated 4,8% of its total R&D support to basic research in that year.” (SEI
2006, ch.4 p.13). In addition, “The development of new and improved goods, services, and
3basic research programs is introduced. Furthermore, the innovations of both
public and industrial R&D are granted of patent protection. Public research
introduces new basic discoveries a share of which can be usefully developed by
the private industry to create a new commercial valuable product. This share
can be assumed to be stochastic. The industrial sector pays the licenses to
develop the patented public innovations. Therefore, it will only appropriate a
share of the ﬁnal market value of a new product.
This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of the interplay between
industrial and public investments in R&D. The results show that the subsidy
to private R&D cost and the intellectual appropriation’s share of a commer-
cial valuable idea by a private R&D ﬁrm are two - in some sense - equivalent
ways to ﬁnance the industrial R&D eﬀort. In fact, both these ways increase
the private innovative eﬀort and the per capita output growth rate, while they
reduce the per capita output level. Yet, the subsidy and the intellectual ap-
propriation of a new idea have some fundamental diﬀerences The subsidy of
the private R&D cost concerns the certainty aspect of a R&D process, while
the intellectual appropriation’s share of a commercial valuable idea concerns
the uncertainty aspect of a R&D process. Furthermore, the subsidy and the
intellectual appropriation have deep diﬀerences from an institutional point of
view. The intellectual appropriation of new ideas concerns both public and pri-
vate research activity, and the policy ‘design’ of the IPR involves the political,
executive, legal, and jurisprudential powers of a country. The subsidy to pri-
vate research cost does not deeply shape the institutional set-up of a country
as the IPR policy ‘design’ does, and it can also be used as a ﬁne-tuning policy
instrument.
Although the mere introduction of some form of IPR regime for public in-
novations reveals to be an eﬃcient way to stimulate both the private innovative
eﬀort and the per capita output growth rate of a country. A policy implication
is that - once IPR are introduced for public innovations - a diﬀerent regime for
private and public innovations should be introduced. Patents to public innova-
tions should be only granted to some radical and very innovative ideas. In fact,
the existence of IPR for public innovations generates a further R&D cost for the
industrial sector to acquire the licenses from public institutions. This implies
that a patent design should guarantee a larger patentability requirement and a
lower leading breadth for public basic ideas than for industrial innovations.8 In
fact, a larger patentability requirement and a lower leading breadth both allow
the private ﬁrm to appropriate of a higher share of a new product’s market
processes is dominated by industry, which performed 90.2% of all U.S. development in 2004.”
(SEI 2006, ch.4 p.13).
8The patentability requirement is a minimum innovation size required to receive a patent.
A patent breadth’s put restrictions on the products other ﬁrms can produce without a license.
In particular, the leading breadth limits future innovators by specifying superior products that
other ﬁrms can not produce (see O’Donoghue, 1998, and O’Donoghue and Zweimuller, 2004).
B a s e do nt h e s ed e ﬁnitions, the leading breadth could only concern a new marketable product,
and it could not apply at a basic innovation that - by its own deﬁnition - does not have an
immediate and speciﬁc market application. However, if the leading breadth also applies at a
basic innovation, the policy implication of the paper follows.
4value. The policy to grant patents at few and very radical basic innovations for
the public sector does not restrict the technological transfer from universities to
industrial R&D. In fact, the empirical analyses show that the private sector uses
many channels to access public and universities discoveries. Cohen et al. (2002)
ﬁnd that the most important channels to access publicly funded research are
publications, conferences, informal interactions rather than more institutional
channels such as patents, licenses, and cooperative ventures. These results refer
to all industrial sectors, even the high-tech industries.9
Recently, a paper by Cozzi and Galli (2007) focuses on the sequential na-
ture of the innovation process within a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
Their paper considers a two stage innovation process, and it evaluates the con-
ditions under which IPR should be extended to basic discoveries that does not
have an immediate and speciﬁc marketable application and a commercial value.
Cozzi and Galli (2007) show that a pro-growth policy consisting into guarantee
an intellectual property protection for ‘basic half-ideas’ was at the ground of
the reforms undertaken in the U.S. around the ’80s. Moreover, Cozzi and Galli
(2007) explicitly determine the market value of a ‘basic half-idea’. The focus of
this paper is on the strength and width of patents granted to public R&D, once
patent protection for public innovation already exists in a country. Therefore,
this paper complements Cozzi and Galli’s (2007) contribution. O’Donoghue and
Zweimuller (2004) study the general equilibrium implications of a larger patent
protection against future innovators within a neo-Shumpeterian growth frame-
work. Their results show that both a larger patentability requirement and a
larger leading breadth spur the private innovative eﬀort, and therefore the per
capita output growth rate. However, their work does not consider neither the
role of the public R&D investment nor a patent protection for public innova-
tions.
Furthermore, and diﬀerently from Cozzi and Galli (2007), this paper shows
how the mixed empirical evidence about the substitutability-complementarity
relationship between public and private R&D investment can be explained. It
is shown that a higher public investment in R&D can either crowd out or com-
plement private R&D eﬀort. The substitutability-complementarity relationship
between public and private R&D investment depends on the structural parame-
ters of the economy, on the population growth rate, and on the intensity through
which private and public R&D aﬀect the probability to ﬁnd a new commercial
valuable idea. In particular, it is shown that whenever population growth rate
is not high enough, a higher public R&D investment diverts too much resources
from the private sector - both manufacturing and R&D - and thus it crowds
out private R&D investment. The eﬀect on the per capita output growth rate
depends on the direct spillovers public innovations generate on the private in-
dustry. As indicated above, the existence of large and positive spillovers from
public R&D to private industry has found by the empirical analysis. This paper
9Cohen et al. (2002) ﬁnd that the pharmaceutical industry more heavily conveys public
research knowledge through patents and licenses. However, the same authors maintain that
even in this industry informal channels and open science are still more important in conveying
public R&D discoveries.
5proves that - because of these large spillovers - a higher public investment in
R&D better oﬀ the growth performance of a country. These results are rein-
forced when population growth rate is high enough, so that a higher public R&D
investment only crowds out the manufacturing resources, while it complements
the private innovative eﬀort. Finally, the existence of a trade-oﬀ between the
per capita output growth rate and level has found. This trade-oﬀ is stronger
when a complementarity relationship between private and public R&D exists.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, section 3
describes the general equilibrium results, section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
This economy is composed of a ﬁnal good sector, of an intermediate good sector,
and of a R&D sector. As in Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998), competitive ﬁrms
produce a homogeneous ﬁnal consumption good by using a ﬁx e di n p u t ,a n da
continuum of intermediate goods with heterogeneous productivity. Intermediate
sector produces a continuum of products denoted by Nt at a given time t ≥ 0.
The mass of intermediate goods is continuously enlarging thanks to serendipi-
tous imitation as in Howitt (2000). The manufacturing sector is characterized
by free entry and exit, and by a constant returns to scale technology: workers
can be hired by a continuum of ﬁrms that produce their intermediate goods
on a one to one basis from labor. A legally imposed distortion - the Patent
System - renders each of them a local monopoly. According to the standard
Schumpeterian approach à la Aghion and Howitt (1992 and 1998), each inter-
mediate monopolistic ﬁrm is challenged by outsider R&D ﬁrms trying to invent
and patent a better product and - due to instantaneous price competition - drive
the former monopolist out of the market.
The R&D sector is composed of both private and public research. Private
R&D consists into upgrade the quality (or the production process) of the inter-
mediate products (vertical innovation). As said above, a perfectly enforceable
patent law allows the researcher to gain monopolistic rents for all the eﬀective
duration of the patent, because - as usual in neo-Schumpeterian growth mod-
els with vertical innovation - the incumbent monopolist can be replaced by the
next innovator in the same product line.10 Therefore, it generates the Schum-
peterian creative destruction eﬀect. The existence of a perfect stock market
channels consumer savings to ﬁrms engaged in R&D. Moreover, the R&D sec-
tor is composed of public research: the government employes skilled workers
to obtain basic innovations and discoveries. According to the legislative acts
mentioned in the introduction, patents are granted to basic innovations. These
basic innovations are developed by private R&D ﬁrms to ﬁnd a new commercial
valuable innovation and to introduce new intermediate goods.
10See Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998), Segerstrom (1998), Howitt (1999). Cozzi (2007)
proves that the standard neo-Schumpeterian growth models are compatible with a positive
and ﬁnite R&D investment by the incumbent monopolistic ﬁr m s .T h ea n a l y s i so ft h i sp a p e r
is also compatible with Cozzi’s (2007) ﬁndings.
62.1 Basic Framework
Let us assume continuous time and unbounded horizon. In this economy a
mass Lt > 0 of inﬁnitely lived families exists. Each family has an identical
preference for non-negative consumption ﬂows represented by the intertemporal
utility function
R ∞
0 e−rtCtdt,w h e r eCt is the non negative consumption ﬂow
of each household, r>0 is the common and constant subjective rate of time
preference. The linear instantaneous utility implies constant real interest rate
always equal to r. Moreover, each family is endowed with a unit mass of ﬂow
labor time bearing no disutility. Population growth is constant and equal to
gL > 0. The labor market is perfect and the inelastic supply of labor Lt is
instantaneously employed by manufacturing ﬁrms and by the R&D sector.
Final output is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms combining the ﬁxed






with 0 <α<1. xit is the amount of intermediate good i produced and
used as an input at a given time t ≥ 0,a n dAit is the productivity parameter
of the current version of that good. M is the aggregate mass of ﬁxed factor
(such as for example, “land, minerals, oils”, etc.). Nt ∈ [0,∞) denotes the
mass of intermediate goods already invented in the economy at date t ≥ 0.
Since in each sector instantaneous Bertrand competition guarantees that only
the most advanced patent holder will be producing, Nt also denotes the mass
of active intermediate good industries. The elasticity of substitution between
intermediate products is equal to ε ≡ 1
1−α > 1.
The perfectly competing R&D ﬁrms try to achieve and appropriate the next
generation of any intermediate good (vertical innovation process). According to
Aghion and Howitt (1998), and Howitt (1999) the leading-edge technology has
considered, with an economy-wide leading edge productivity parameter Amax
t
that exerts positive R&D spillovers in all intermediate goods. When a new
commercial valuable discovery is introduced into an intermediate product line
i (a better quality of that intermediate good is introduced) the productivity
parameter Ait in that line jumps to Amax
t .T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation incarnates Aghion
and Howitt’s (1998 ch. 3) and Howitt’s (1999) inter-sector knowledge spillovers.
The technological frontier Amax
t grows deterministically at a rate propor-
tional to the per product line rate of vertical innovations. The Poisson arrival
rate of vertical innovations in any product line i is λAf (lAt,b t). λA is a produc-
tivity factor, lAt = LAt
Nt is the per product line research labor time, bt = Bt
Nt is
the per product line stock of basic knowledge that can be usefully developed to
generate a new patentable and commercial valuable idea in any product line i.
The function f (lAt,b t) captures the eﬀect of the two R&D eﬀorts, private and
public, into generate a new marketable product and therefore to increase the
technological frontier (see the appendix A, point 1). As the economy develops
an increasing number of intermediate goods, an innovation of a given size in any
product line will have a smaller impact on the aggregate economy; hence the
7marginal impact of each innovation on the stock of public knowledge will be σ
Nt,
where σ>1 is a proportionality factor. The aggregate ﬂow of vertical innova-
tions is the number of intermediate goods Nt times the expected ﬂow of vertical
innovations per industry line. The economy-wide rate of vertical technological











λAf (lAt,b t)=σλAf (lAt,b t) (2)
The generic speciﬁcation of f (·) leaves room to many ways through which
the stock of basic knowledge aﬀects the productivity of private R&D. As an
example, only a share of the stock of basic knowledge can be usefully developed,
and/or the duplication argument can be applied both to private innovative
eﬀort and to basic discoveries.11 Therefore, a new better quality version of any
intermediate product is the result of private innovation that renders marketable
and commercial valuable the oﬀsprings of both public basic and private research
eﬀort.
According to this framework, in equilibrium we will observe an ever-evolving
intersectoral distribution of the absolute productivity parameters Ait,w i t hv a l -
ues ranging from 0 to Amax
t .D e ﬁning a ≡ Ait
Amax
t , we can concentrate on the
relative intersectoral distribution, that - as shown in Aghion and Howitt (1998,
ch. 3) and in Howitt (1999) - converges to the unique stationary distribution of
relative productivity parameters - a - characterized by cumulative distribution
function H (a)=a
1
σ,w i t h0 ≤ a ≤ 1. Every time a better quality of an inter-
mediate good is introduced into the economy, the absolute distribution will be
re-scaled rightward because the technological process rises to Amax
t .
The mass of intermediate products grows as a result of serendipitous im-
itation, not deliberate innovation.12 Each person has the same propensity to
imitate β>0, thus the aggregate ﬂow of new products is:
˙ Nt = βLt (3)
Sine population grows at the constant rate gL, the number of workers per
product line Lt
Nt converges monotonically to
gL
β .
11The per product line stock of basic ideas bt encompasses all discoveries that can be useful
to private industry in a wide meaning. It includes all basic ideas that help each private
economic agent to have new ideas, insights, developments, etc. Since intellectual property
rights for public R&D ideas exist - a share of the stock of basic discoveries bt has obtained a
patent grant - the private ﬁrm incurs a cost to use patented basic discoveries. Notice that the
spillovers per product line basic discoveries have on the productivity of private research eﬀort
concerns the stock of basic knowledge accumulated over time, and not only the ﬂow of new
basic discoveries. Hence, the stock of basic ideas can be used for the development of diﬀerent
versions of an intermediate product.
12See Howitt (2000). In Howitt (1999), and Cozzi and Spinesi (2005) horizontal innovation
is motivated by the same proﬁt seeking objectives as quality improving innovation. The results
of this paper are not qualitatively aﬀected by this speciﬁcation for horizontal innovation.
82.2 Asset Market, Manufacturing, and Vertical R&D
The private and public research eﬀort allows to increase the technological fron-
tier. As remarked in the introduction, a public basic idea does not have an
immediate and speciﬁc commercial application, and it will be developed by the
industrial R&D sector to ﬁnd a new marketable intermediate product. There-
fore, the commercial value of a new intermediate product is given by the ﬁrm’s
expected stock market value that monopolizes the commercialization of the new
intermediate product. Let Vt be the expected stock market value of a new in-
termediate product with maximum productivity Amax
t .T h e p r i v a t e ﬁrm pays
for the use of patented public basic ideas, and therefore it will appropriate a
share of the commercial value of the new intermediate product. The share of
the market value respectively appropriated by the private R&D ﬁrm and by the
public research unit that have contributed to introduce the new intermediate
product is described as a Nash-bargaining solution between these two forces.
The bargaining process is described as taking place between a representative
ﬁrm and a public institution from which the rights on the patented basic inno-
vations are acquired. Because of the symmetry in the R&D sector, each R&D
ﬁrm behaves symmetrically.13 Let V
p
t be the expected stock market value of a
new intermediate product appropriated by the private R&D ﬁrm, and let V b
t
be the expected stock market value of a new intermediate product appropriated
by the public institution, with Vt = V
p
t +V b
t . The expected stock market value













s.t. Vt = V
p
t + V b
t (4)
The solution to this problem gives V
p
t = φVt,a n dV b
t =( 1 − φ)Vt.T h e
parameter φ ∈ (0,1) represents the institutional set-up in which the bargaining
process takes place.14 The existence of laws such as the Bayh-Dole Act - and
of other legislative arrangements - heavily contribute to determine the value of
the parameter φ in the economy. In fact, φ indicates that a private R&D ﬁrm
13Because of the macroeconomic framework of this paper, the bargaining process is here
described with a centralized set-up. A representative ﬁrm bargains with a centralized public
institution to buy the rights on a stock of basic ideas per unit of time. This stock can be
usefully developed by private R&D ﬁrms.
14As shown by Cozzi and Galli (2007) the mere introduction of IPR for public basic ideas
can better oﬀ the growth performance of a country. In this paper the tightness and the ease
of the IPR regime - as measured by φ - has studied. Therefore, φ<1 is assumed. On
the other hand a low value of φ can indicate that it is extremely easy for public R&D to
obtain patent grants for any basic innovation. This implies that private ﬁrms must pay to
also use basic discoveries that have a very low innovative power. When φ =0any incentive
for private R&D eﬀort disappears, i.e. lAt =0 . Therefore, φ>0 is assumed. Notice that, in
this macroeconomic set-up, the share (1 − φ) appropriated by the public sector can encompass
diﬀerent public patents all useful to develop a new intermediate product, and not just one
patented basic public idea. As indicated in the Appendix A, point 1, the per product line
stock of basic innovations granted of patent protection can be a random variable p ∈ [0, ¯ p] with
9pays to use basic ideas which are granted of some form of IPR. In what follows
the parameter φ is assumed constant within each intermediate product line
and between them. Because the break-down of the bargaining process between
private and public institutions gives a zero value at both of them, at least one
ﬁrm will buy the basic patented ideas. In fact, because of the symmetry, all
R&D ﬁrms will pay the same price for the basic ideas and they will appropriate
of a share φ of the expected commercial value of an innovation Vt. On the other
hand, the government will have the incentive to license the same basic ideas at
l e a s ta to n ep r i v a t eR & Dﬁrm.
Each vertical R&D ﬁrm targeting an intermediate product i chooses its R&D
intensity to maximize φVtλAψ (lAjt,b t) − (1 − s)wtlAjt,w h e r elAjt is the labor
time ﬂow employed by the vertical R&D ﬁrm j at time t, s is the subsidy to
private research. Rational individuals and ﬁrms know they will appropriate a
fraction φ of the expected stock market value of a patentable and commercial
valuable idea. Notice that, the per product line basic stock knowledge is taken
as given by each individual and ﬁrm. This condition determines the optimal
choice lAjt = l∗
Ajt for each R&D ﬁrm (see the appendix A, point 2).
Applying Aghion and Howitt’s (1992 and 1998) methods, the intermediate








because the distribution of relative productivities is unchanging, we do not
classify the sectors by their index i but by their relative productivity a ≡ Ait
Amax
t .
Deﬁning the productivity-adjusted real wage as ωt ≡ wt
Amax
t and normalizing the
ﬁxed factor to one (that is positing M =1 ) the instantaneous labor demand
















is a labor demand function for the manufacturing ﬁrm. The
labor force employed in the manufacturing sector negatively depends on the
productivity-adjusted real wage.
We will focus on the symmetric steady state, that is xit = xt, lAit = lAt,e t c . ,
for every intermediate product line i.15 Because the R&D sector is characterized
by free entry and exit, in equilibrium the following condition must hold for a





− (1 − s)wtl∗
Ajt =0(see the appendix
A, point 2). This condition can be rewritten as:




Because of the intersectoral knowledge spillovers and by the Law of large numbers, the share
of the per product line patented public ideas acquired by the industrial sector is deterministic.











Therefore, in a the multisector economy a condition very similar to the
manufacturing-R&D no-arbitrage equation as in Aghion and Howitt (1998) has
obtained. Notice that, in eq. (6) the wage paid to a researcher in the industrial
R&D laboratory wt is proportional to the average Poisson arrival rate of innova-





By following the same steps as in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 3, Appendix)





















On the right hand side of eq. (7) the discount rate (r + gA/σ),a n dt h ep r o ﬁt
ﬂows Amax
t ˜ π(ωegAτ) accruing to a successful innovator from date t to inﬁnity
have been considered.
2.3 Public R&D
Population diﬀers in the basic research ability, while there are no quality diﬀer-
ences among workers employed in vertical R&D and in manufacturing. Let us
G(θ) be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the ‘basic research ability’




and ¯ θ ≤ 1. The usual properties G
0
(θ) > 0,
G(0) = 0, G
¡¯ θ
¢
=1apply. Since each worker must be indiﬀerent between man-
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additional no-arbitrage condition between improving/manufacturing and basic









θ0wt = ˜ λBθ0wt (8)








represents the spillovers from vertical
innovation to basic research, and ˜ λB ≡ ϕ(1 + σ)λB.16 T h el e f th a n ds i d eo fe q .
(8) indicates the expected returns of manufacturing and improving the quality
of an intermediate product. The right hand side of the last part of eq. (8)
indicates the expected ﬂows return to be employed in basic research. Because












, the research gross salary paid by the public sector is lower than
the wage paid by the industrial R&D laboratory.17 The parameter ˜ λB allows
to increase the perceived salary of a public researcher. In this framework the
parameter ˜ λB also positively depends on public expenditures.18
Let us denote θ0 the threshold value of the ‘basic research ability’ that
satisﬁes equality (8): θ0 ability researchers are indiﬀerent between trying to
improve the quality of one of the existing intermediate goods, to be employed
in basic research, and to be employed in the manufacturing sector. The higher
the basic research talent an individual is endowed with, the higher the gain to






which is constant along the BGP.19 Each individual endowed of a research
ability θ>θ 0 will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to be employed in basic research. Hence,
in such an economy, for θ>θ 0, [1 − G(θ0)]Lt individuals will choose to be
employed in basic research. Instead, the individuals endowed with an ability
θ ≤ θ0,t h a ti sG(θ0)Lt, will decide either to introduce a better quality of the
existing intermediate goods, or to work in the manufacturing sector. A policy
that aﬀects the productivity of basic research eﬀort also aﬀects the threshold
ability parameter θ0. T h i si nt u r nc h a n g e st h ep o p u l a t i o ne m p l o y e di nb a s i c
research programs, and therefore the per product line stock of basic knowl-
edge. This implies that the institutional set-up can aﬀect in diﬀerent ways the
interplay between public and private research eﬀort.
The government conducts basic research to accumulate basic knowledge Bt
according to the following dynamic law














Lt is the expected conditioned cumulated
basic research eﬀort, ˜ λB is the productivity of each researcher engaged in basic
research. Eq. (10) implies that the stock of basic knowledge Bt is accumulated
at the same rate as the population growth rate gL.
17See Aghion et. al (2005), and the Science and Engineering Indicators (2004, 2006) for the
empirical evidence of an average higher wage gained in the private R&D laboratories than in
nonproﬁt/government R&D laboratories.
18To ﬁx ideas, the public expenditures aﬀect the quality of laboratories equipment, because
higher public expenditures allow to have higher quality of equipment. This aﬀect the expected
and perceived gain of a public researcher. Moreover, public researcher often obtains some
ﬁnancial support from a variety of institutions above their contractual gross salary. These
elements contribute to increase the expected gain of a public researcher.
19It assumed that 1
˜ λB
< ¯ θ ≤ 1.
12The government uses proceeds from basic innovations to ﬁnance the public
research and to subsidize vertical R&D ﬁrms. The public balanced budget in
each instant of time requires (see Appendix A, point 3):
m(θ0)Ltwt + swtNtlAt + E (Amax
t )Lt =
= Ntd(1 − φ)Vt + τ (Amax
t )Lt
(11)
The left hand side of eq. (11) represents public outlays to ﬁnance both pri-
vate and public R&D eﬀort. m(θ0)Ltwt are the total outlays for the wages
paid at researchers employed in public research, swtNtlAt are the total outlays
to subsidize private research eﬀort, E (Amax
t )Lt indicates the public expendi-
tures that are proportional to the leading-edge productivity parameter and to
population. The right hand side of eq. (11) indicates the total proceeds of the
public sector. The government appropriates a fraction (1 − φ) of the expected
stock market value of a marketable patented idea Vt from both successful and
unsuccessful R&D ﬁrms, d indicates the per product line number of the out-
sider R&D ﬁrms. The parameter τ is a lump-sum tax that is proportional to
leading-edge technology parameter Amax
t .20
2.4 Labor and Asset Market Equilibrium
Each researcher endogenously decides to allocate her research labor time to
inventive or to manufacturing activity.
Plugging these results in the manufacturing/vertical R&D arbitrage condi-















Solving the above equation for ˜ x(ω), the labor force employed in the pro-





















from which, by inverting eq. (13), it is possible to determine the productivity-
adjusted real wage ωt.
The labor market clearing condition for manufacturing and vertical innova-
tion is:
20In this framework all variables are proportional to the leading-edge productivity parameter
Amax
t . Along the BGP, the per capita consumption grows over time at the same rate as the
per capita ﬁnal output Yt
Lt . In fact, the ﬁnal output is also the unique and homogeneous
consumption good of the economy. Moreover, the linear preferences imply a constant path
of the per capita consumption over time. These two elements imply that - along the BGP -
what is constant over time is the productivity-adjusted per capita consumption. Therefore,
also a lump-sum tax must be proportional to the leading-edge productivity parameter Amax
t .
13G(θ0)Lt = NtlAt + Nt
Z 1
0





where ˜ x(ω/a) is the labor demand function of a product line with relative
productivity parameter a at the date t,a n dh(a) is the density function of the
relative productivities’ cumulative distribution function H(a).
The labor market clearing condition for basic research is:
[1 − G(θ0)]Lt = LBt (15)
which - because the threshold ability parameter θ0 is constant along the
BGP - is a constant fraction of the population.
From eq. (1), and reclassifying intermediate goods by their relative produc-
tivities, the aggregate GDP can be written as (see Aghion and Howitt 1998, ch.
























































Therefore, the ﬁxed factor rent increases in the number of intermediate
goods, simply because they complement it in the production of the ﬁnal good;
and it decreases in the productivity-adjusted real wage.
3 General Equilibrium
The economy has a unique rational expectation equilibrium on which ratio-
nal individuals instantaneously jump on. From now onward the time index is
eliminated for the sake of notational simplicity.
Let us consider the law of motion of the basic knowledge (10), along the
































Let us consider both eq.s (19) and (14), along the rational expectation equi-
librium, a positive and ﬁnite value for the per product line vertical research



























where, along the BGP, b =
m(θ0)˜ λB
β . From eq. (20) the per product line
private research eﬀort is obtained (see the Appendix B).





















where eq. (16) has been used. Therefore, the per capita output growth rate
is equal to the technological frontier growth rate:
gY/L = gA = σλAf (lA,b) (22)
By considering the eq.s from (18) to (22) the following can be stated:
Proposition 1 Along the rational expectation BGP, a constant fraction of pop-
ulation is employed in manufacturing, private and public research. Along the
BGP, an increase either in the private intellectual appropriation parameter φ or
in the subsidy s positively aﬀects the per capita output growth rate and negatively
aﬀects the per capita output level.
Proof. See Appendix B and C
The industrial intellectual appropriation’s share of a new commercial valu-
able idea and the subsidy of the private R&D cost are two alternative ways to
ﬁnance industrial research eﬀort. Yet, some fundamental diﬀerences between
these two ways exist. The policy ‘design’ of the IPR regime of valuable ideas
concerns the uncertainty aspect of a R&D process and it involves the political,
executive, jurisprudential authorities of a country. Therefore, this policy ‘de-
sign’ strongly shapes the institutional set-up in which both private and public
R&D operate. The subsidy of the industrial R&D cost does not shape the in-
stitutional set-up of the economy as the policy ’design’ of the IPR does, and it
only directly aﬀects the private R&D cost, and therefore the certainty aspect
of a R&D process. Moreover, the subsidy can be also managed in short time
horizon.
15Given these fundamental diﬀerences between the IPR regime and the support
of industrial R&D cost, and the subsidy to R&D, both the industrial intellectual
appropriation share φ and the subsidy s spur the per product line vertical re-
search eﬀort. However, this eﬀect can be diﬀerent in magnitude, as the following
states:
Proposition 2 Whenever condition (D1) holds along the BGP with a public
balanced budget - i.e. s ≥ 1 − φ - a larger subsidy would produce a higher per
capita output growth rate and a lower per capita output level than what could be
obtained from a higher private intellectual appropriation parameter φ.
Proof. See Appendix D
Let us consider the public balanced budget along the BGP:
gL













t Nt = E
gL
β is a constant term, and ¯ lA is the per product
line vertical labor time research eﬀort. Eq. (23) allows to obtain the tax rate
τ such that equality ¯ s =1− φ holds. Once this equality holds along the BGP,
a marginal increase in the subsidy greatly spurs the industrial research eﬀort
and the per capita output growth rate. Yet, a marginal increase in the subsidy
magniﬁes the trade-oﬀ between the per capita output growth rate and the per
capita output level. Notice that the higher φ the lower the threshold subsidy ¯ s
that greatly aﬀects the per capita output growth rate and the per capita output
level. This means that the larger the private appropriation share of the expected
stock market value of a new commercial valuable idea, the lower the subsidy to
spur the industrial investment in R&D and the growth rate of a country.
Because φ is a measure of the strength, tightness and ease of IPR granted to
public innovations, proposition 2 has a main policy implication. Once some form
of IPR are introduced for public ideas, two diﬀerent regimes of IPR against fu-
ture innovators should be provided for public and private innovations. In partic-
ular, the diﬀerent regime concerns in this framework a patent protection against
future innovators, and therefore it refers to both patentability requirement and
to patent breadth.21 O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) show that both a
larger patentability requirement and leading breadth better oﬀ the growth per-
formance of a country. This paper shows that because patented basic ideas are a
cost for a private R&D ﬁrm, a larger patentability requirement for a public ba-
sic idea reduces the industrial R&D cost and better oﬀ the growth performance
of a country. Instead, a larger leading breadth for a public basic innovation
generates a cost of licences for both universities and private ﬁrms, and this dis-
courages the R&D eﬀort. Therefore, a larger patentability requirement and a
21Because the leading breadth limits future innovators by specifying superior products that
other ﬁrms can not produce, it could not apply at a basic idea that does not have an immediate
and speciﬁc market application. However, to be as general as possible, also a leading breadth
for non marketable basic ideas has considered.
16lower leading breadth should be set for public basic ideas than for industrial
innovations. In this way, a higher value of the parameter φ can be obtained,
and therefore also a low subsidy of the industrial R&D cost greatly spurs the
innovative eﬀort and the per capita output growth rate of a country.
Let us now suppose that the oﬀsprings of public research also depends on
public expenditures e.22 As proven in the Appendix E, whenever the population
grows at a high enough rate, a larger per product line public expenditures e in
basic R&D programs spurs the private R&D investment. This in turn implies a
higher per capita output growth rate and a lower per capita output level. The
results are summarized in the following
Proposition 3 When condition (E4) holds along the BGP a higher public in-
vestment in R&D determines: a) a higher per product line industrial R&D eﬀort;
b) a higher per capita output growth rate; c) a lower per capita output level.
Proof. See Appendix E
When the public sector invests resources in public R&D to endow researchers
of better equipment and instruments, more talented researchers will ﬁnd it prof-
itable to work in that research programs. A larger proportion of the population
will choose to be employed in public research. This in turn can also spur the
private research eﬀort and investment to gain from a higher productivity of
b a s i cr e s e a r c h . T h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of a higher public expenditure on the per
capita output growth rate is then magniﬁed from both these elements. On the
other hand, the workforce employed in the manufacturing sector - as well as
the demand for each intermediate monopolistic ﬁrm - will be lower along the
new BGP. Therefore, also the negative eﬀect on the per capita output level has
magniﬁed from a higher public expenditure in basic R&D.
These results also depend on a threshold for the population growth rate.
When the population growth rate is not high enough, an increase in the public
expenditure to ﬁnance public R&D discourages the industrial research eﬀort
and reduces the per capita output level (see the Appendix E). In fact, a larger
fraction of the population will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to work in public R&D, and
a lower faction of the population will be employed in both manufacturing and
private R&D. Yet, in this case the population growth rate is not high enough to
compensate the private ﬁrm for the reduced market demand of an intermediate
product. This in turn implies a lower private innovative eﬀo r td u et oat o ol o w
market demand for each intermediate good. In this case, the ﬁnal eﬀect on the
per capita output growth rate is not univocal and it depends on the relative
22We can think to e as public investment in material goods used in the public R&D programs,
such as more productive machineries, more modern laboratory equipment, libraries, latest
computers and software programs, etc. These expenditures can increase the productivity of
each R&D worker employed in public research. Therefore ˜ λB = ˜ λB (e),w i t h
∂˜ λB
∂e > 0.T h i s
means that the productivity of each researcher in ﬁnding new basic discoveries depends on her
personal ability, and it is also positively aﬀected by the equipment, libraries, machineries, etc.
she works with. Moreover, a higher public expenditure can concern larger ﬁnancial support
and research funds for each researcher, so that all these elements increase the salary gained
by public researchers above the contractual salary wt.




fact, if the spillovers of basic discoveries to the Poisson arrival rate of innovation
are strong enough to compensate the reduction in the private innovative eﬀort,
the per capita output growth rate rises. Therefore, also the existence of a
trade-oﬀ between the per capita output growth rate and the per capita output
level depends on the spillovers’ strength that basic discoveries produce on the
innovative capacity of private R&D ﬁrms.
Notice that these results depends on a population growth rate threshold
that is determined by the structural and institutional parameters of the econ-
omy. Moreover, these results contribute to explain the mixed substitutabil-
ity/complementarity relationship between private and public R&D investment.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
Since the ’80s the U.S. adopted several legislative acts to spur the transfer of
knowledge and innovations from public funded research programs to private
industry. The most inﬂuential legislative act has been the Bayh-Dole Act of the
1980 that created an uniform federal patent policy that allowed universities and
small businesses to retain rights to any patents resulting from government and
federal agency funded research and to licence these patents on an exclusive or
non-exclusive basis. Based on the belief that legislative arrangements such as the
Bayh-Dole Act enhance the technology transfer and the academic contributions
to innovation and growth in the U.S., similar legislation is being considered in
other OECD countries.
Strong intertwined relationships between private and public R&D have doc-
umented by the empirical evidence. On the one hand, the existence of large
spillovers from public research activity towards private industry is widely recog-
nized. On the other hand, both a complementarity and substitutability rela-
tionship between public and private R&D investment has been found.
This paper investigates on the macroeconomic implications of the ties be-
tween public and private R&D and it sheds light to explain the empirical ev-
idence just mentioned. To this aim a neo-Schumpeterian growth model à la
Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) and à la Howitt (1999, 2000) has been adopted.
In the R&D sector, public research generate basic ideas that do not have an
immediate and speciﬁc commercial value and application. According to the in-
stitutional set-up of the U.S., IPR are granted at these basic ideas. The private
R&D sector pays for licenses on such basic patented innovations and it develops
these basic ideas to introduce a better intermediate product in the marketplace.
Therefore, the industrial sector appropriates a share of the ﬁnal commercial
value of each product, being another share paid at the public sector for the
licenses on the usefully developed patented basic ideas. Moreover, an industrial
R&D ﬁrm obtains a subsidy for its research cost.
This paper shows that the IPR and the subsidy to private R&D cost are
two alternative ways to ﬁnance the private research eﬀort. Both the intellectual
appropriation parameter and the subsidy to R&D spur the private innovative
18eﬀort. This in turn generates a trade oﬀ between the per capita output growth
rate and level, by increasing the former and reducing the second. This result
seems remarkable because the policy design of the IPR strongly shapes the
institutional set-up of the economy, and it concerns the uncertainty aspect of
a R&D process. While the subsidy of the private R&D cost does not have an
institutional ‘weight’ as the IPR has, and it concerns the certainty aspect of a
R&D process. An important policy implication concerns the IPR regime. Once
the IPR are also granted at public ideas, two diﬀerent regimes of IPR against
future innovators should be provided for public and industrial innovations. In
particular, a larger patentability requirement and a lower leading breadth should
be granted for basic public ideas than for industrial innovations. This policy
allows at a low subsidy to private R&D cost to greatly spur the innovative eﬀort
and the per capita output growth rate of the economy.
Moreover, it is shown that public investments in R&D can explain the mixed
empirical evidence about the substitutability-complementarity relationship be-
tween public and private innovative eﬀo r t .I ti ss h o w nt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
public investment in R&D can either crowd out or complement private R&D
eﬀort. The substitutability-complementarity relationship between public and
private R&D eﬀort depends on the structural parameters of the economy and
on the population growth rate. When population grows at a high enough pace,
a higher public investment in R&D complements the industrial research eﬀort
and it only crowds out the demand for each intermediate product. This in turn
generates a trade oﬀ between the per capita output growth and level. However,
because the existence of large and positive direct spillovers from public R&D
to private industry has found by the empirical analyses, the this paper shows
that a higher public investment better oﬀ the growth performance of a coun-
try whatever is the relationship between private and public R&D investments,
either substitutability or complementarity.
19Appendix A
1. Each vertical R&D ﬁrm j has a Poisson arrival rate of innovation at a given
time t>0 described by λAψ (lAjt,b t). The function ψ(lAjt,b t) has positive ﬁrst
partial derivative, it is concave in lAjt,a n di ts a t i s ﬁes the Inada condition, that
is lim
lAjt→0




ψ1 (lAjt,b t) → 0,w h e r e
gL
β G(θ0)
denotes the maximum employment level in the private R&D sector. This point
will become clear later to the reader. Along the BGP, a symmetry in each
product line i between the R&D ﬁrms exists, so that lAjt = lAt
d ,w h e r ed is
the number of R&D ﬁrms in the product line i. The Poisson arrival rate of
innovation is independently distributed across ﬁrms, across industry lines, and











= λAf (lAt,b t).T h ef u n c t i o nf (lAt,b t)
is assumed to have strictly increasing partial derivative and it is concave in lAt.
Q.E.D.
The per product line stock of basic knowledge bt encompasses both patented
and non-patented basic public ideas. The share of public discoveries granted
of patent protection - for which industrial R&D pays for their use - can be
described as a random variable. In this case, this share is a continuum random
variable p ∈ [0, ¯ p] common for all the industry lines and constant over time ,
with ¯ p<b t and with a common cumulative distribution function F (p).
2. Each vertical R&D ﬁrm targeting an intermediate product i chooses its
R&D intensity to maximize φVtλAψ(lAjt,b t) − (1 − s)wtlAjt.T h e ﬁrst order
condition for a private R&D ﬁrm implies
φVtλAψ1 (lAjt,b t) ≤ (1 − s)wt. Because ψ(lAjt,b t) is assumed concave in
lAjt the ﬁrst order condition is also suﬃcient for a maximum. The interior
solution implies φVtλAψ1 (lAjt,b t)=( 1− s)wt. The R&D sector is character-
ized by free entry and exit, therefore the following condition must be satisﬁed
for any R&D ﬁrm: φVtλAψ (lAjt,b t) − (1 − s)wtlAjt ≥ 0. When the marginal
ﬁrm enters in the R&D race this condition will be binding, at that point the
marginal ﬁrm will be indiﬀerent between to enter or do not enter in the R&D












is obtained. This condition















lAjt, the average productivity
ψ(lAjt,bt)









is always satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
3. In this point the eq. (11) has obtained. By following the same steps
as in Aghion and Howitt (1998), the proﬁt ﬂow of a monopolistic ﬁrm that

















20where ωt ≡ wt
Amax
t is the productivity-adjusted real wage, ˜ π (ω) is the proﬁt
ﬂow of the intermediate good with the maximum productivity parameter Amax
t .
The expected stock market value of the last successful R&D ﬁrm that has pro-
ductivity Amax
t is described by the eq. (5) in the text. The expected stock
market value of an intermediate product i with absolute productivity Ait and
relative productivity Ait
Amax
t is Vit = Vta
1
1−α. Therefore, the cumulative expected

















Let d be the number of the per product line outsider R&D ﬁrms. The public
sector appropriates a share (1 − φ) of the expected stock market value of a
patented idea from each R&D ﬁrm, successful and unsuccessful. Therefore a
balanced budget requires
m(θ0)Ltwt + swtNtlAt + E (Amax
t )Lt =
= dNt (1 − φ)Vt + τ (Amax
t )Lt, (A2)
In this setting the Arrow’s eﬀect is assumed to be at work. This implies that
the incumbent ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to undertake R&D. However, as
proven by Cozzi (2007) this framework can not exclude positive investment in
R&D by the incumbent ﬁrm. If this argument would be considered, all the
analysis remained valid by simply replacing n = d+1to d in the paper. Q.E.D.
Appendix B
In this Appendix the per product line vertical research labor time lAt along
the BGP is obtained. From now onward the time index is eliminated for the






















where - along the BGP - L
N =
gL
β . Let us consider the left hand side of eq.
(B1). The research labor time of a R&D ﬁrm j is l∗
Aj = lA
d .F o rlA → 0,s ot h a t
also l∗























= ∞, and therefore the left hand side of eq. (B1) is
always strictly positive for l∗
Aj → 0.F o rlA →
gL
β G(θ0) t h el e f th a n ds i d eo fe q .











β G(θ0) − lA
i
− r →− r<0.
Let us turn to prove that the left hand side of eq. (B1) is a strictly monotonic























where the research labor time of a R&D ﬁrm j is l∗
Aj = lA
d . Therefore, it
will be
∂Λ




































f1 (lA,b) < 0
(B3)
The ﬁrst order condition for a maximum proﬁt and the free entry condition























. Moreover, the labor market clearing condition
implies that
gL
β G(θ0) ≥ lA. Therefore the inequality (B3) is proven. The





, with values ranging from +∞ to −r.
The right hand side of eq. (B1) is assumed to be an increasing and concave
function of lA,w i t hb taken as given by each R&D ﬁrm. These conditions imply
the existence of a unique and stable steady state of the per product line vertical
research labor time eﬀort 0 < ¯ lA <
gL
β G(θ0). Notice that in this proof f (lA,b)
is not necessarily a concave function of both its arguments lA and b. Q.E.D.
Appendix C
The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sA p p e n d i xp r o v e st h ee ﬀect of a higher private intel-
lectual appropriation parameter φ on the economic performance of a country,
φ ∈ (0,1) is assumed. The second part analyses the eﬀect of a higher R&D
subsidy.


























∂lA < 0 from inequality (B3), and
h
gL
β G(θ0) − ¯ lA
i
> 0. Therefore,
along the BGP, a higher intellectual appropriation parameter φ increases the
per product line private R&D eﬀort. Q.E.D.
In order to determine the eﬀects of a higher private intellectual appropriation
parameter φ on the market demand for any existing intermediate good, we use
the labor market clearing condition:





22where lB = LB
N =[ 1− G(θ0)] L
N denotes the per product line basic research
eﬀort. From eq. (8) a constant threshold ability parameter θ0 is obtained.
Therefore - along the new BGP with a higher private intellectual appropriation
parameter φ - the per product line basic research eﬀort [1 − G(θ0)] L
N is constant
and equal to [1 − G(θ0)]
gL
β . Moreover, eq. (C1) proves that, along the new
BGP, the per product line vertical research eﬀort is higher. Therefore, eq. (C2)




for each existing intermediate
good. Finally, from eq. (21), it immediately follows that a higher appropriation
parameter φ determines a lower per capita output level. Q.E.D.
The positive eﬀect of a change in the appropriation parameter φ on the per











where the inequality follows from eq. (C1). Q.E.D.
2. This part analyses the eﬀect of a change in the subsidy to private research
eﬀort s on the economic performance of the economy; s ∈ (0,1) is assumed.



























∂lA < 0 from inequality (B3), and
h
gL
β G(θ0) − ¯ lA
i
> 0. Therefore,
along the BGP a positive relationship between the subsidy to private research
eﬀort s and the per product line private R&D labor time ¯ lA is proven. Q.E.D.
In order to determine the eﬀects of a higher subsidy s on the market demand
for any existing intermediate good, the labor market clearing condition (C2) is
used. As proven above, along the BGP, the per product line basic research eﬀort
is constant and equal to [1 − G(θ0)]
gL
β . Moreover, eq. (C4) proves that - along
the new BGP with a higher subsidy to private R&D ﬁrms - the per product
line vertical research eﬀort is higher. Therefore, eq. (C2) necessarily implies a




for each existing intermediate good. Finally, from
eq. (21), it immediately follows that a higher subsidy s determines a lower per
capita output level. Q.E.D.
The positive eﬀect of a change in the subsidy to private research eﬀort s on











where the inequality follows from eq. (C4). Q.E.D.
Appendix D
23This Appendix compares the eﬀect of a marginal change in the appropriation
parameter φ with the eﬀect of a marginal change in the subsidy s.A l o n gan e w
BGP with a larger value of either φ or s determines a higher per product line
private innovation eﬀort and a higher per capita output growth rate. In order to
compare the magnitude of these eﬀects it suﬃces to consider the eq.s (C1) and
(C4). Whenever the following condition is satisﬁed ∂¯ lA
∂s ≥ ∂¯ lA
∂φ , an increase in the
subsidy generates the same economic eﬀects as an increase in the appropriation
parameter φ, but the former are higher in magnitude. In fact, from eq.s (C1)
and (C4), it immediately follows that ∂¯ lA
∂s ≥ ∂¯ lA
∂φ if and only if
s ≥ 1 − φ (D1)
Q.E.D.
Appendix E
In this Appendix the relationship between the per product line vertical R&D
eﬀort and the per product line stock of public basic knowledge is derived. From





































∂lA < 0. The inequality (E1) will be




































. When inequality (E2) holds a complementarity
relationship between public and private R&D eﬀort exists.
When the productivity of public basic research depends on per product line
public expenditures e,t h a ti s˜ λB (e),i ti s
∂˜ λB(e)
∂e > 0,a n dt h e r e f o r ei ti s∂θ0
∂e < 0.
























































is an increasing function of ˜ λB (e);
∂G(θ0)
∂e < 0. Condition (E3)































Finally, whenever gL > max{(E2),(E4)} a higher per product line basic
knowledge - either exogenous or endogenously obtained through a higher public
expenditure - complements the industrial R&D eﬀort, i.e. lA is higher. Q.E.D.
To determine the eﬀects of a higher productivity of the basic research pro-
grams on the per capita output level, we use the labor market clearing condition
(C2):





where lB = LB
N =[ 1 − G(θ0)] L




∂e < 0,a n d




∂e < 0. Moreover, eq. (E3) proves that, along
the new BGP, the per product line vertical research eﬀort is higher. The eq. (C2)




for each existing intermediate
good. From eq. (21), it immediately follows that a higher productivity of basic
research programs reduces the per capita output level. Finally, because the
population employed by private ﬁrms is lower - G(θ0)L is lower - and the per
product line vertical research eﬀort is higher, the negative eﬀect on per capita
output level is magniﬁed by a higher public expenditure. Q.E.D.






















When condition (E4) holds the eq. (E5) is strictly positive. Q.E.D.
When the population growth rate is not high enough, the inequality (E3)
is strictly negative and an increase in the public expenditure to ﬁnance basic
R&D reduces the private innovation eﬀort. As the eq. (E5) shows, the eﬀect on
the per capita output growth rate can not be univocally determined. It depends




∂b .Y e t ,t h ep e r
capita output level is lower because of the lower market demand along each
intermediate product line. Q.E.D.
References
[1] Aghion, P., and Howitt, P. (1992) “A Model of Growth Through Creative
Destruction.” Econometrica 60, 323-351.
25[2] Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1998) Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
[3] Aghion, P., Dewatripont M., and Stein Jeremy C. (2005) “Academic Free-
dom, Private-Sector Focus, and the Process of Innovation” Mimeo.
[4] Cohen, W.M., Nelson, R.R., Walsh, J.P. (2002) “Links and Impacts: The
Inﬂuence of Public Research on Industrial R&D.” Management Science 48,
1-23.
[5] Arrow, K.J. (1962) “The economic Implications of Learning by Doing.”
Review of Economic Studies 29, 155-173.
[6] Cozzi, G. (2005) “Self-fulﬁlling Prophecies and the Composition of Innova-
tion.” European Economic Review 39, 637-637.
[7] Cozzi, G. (2007) “The Arrow Eﬀect under Competitive R&D” The B.E.
Journal of Macroeconomics Contributions 7, art 2.
[8] Cozzi, G., and Galli, S. (2007) “Changing the Research Patenting Regime:
A Schumpeterian Explanation.” Prin 2005 Working Paper Series.
[9] David P. A., Bronwyn H. Hall, Toole A. A. (2000) “Is public R&D a comple-
ment or substitute for private R&D? A review of the econometric evidence”
Research Policy 29, 497-529.
[10] Diamond A.M. (1998) “Does federal funding crowd out private funding of
science?” Presentation at the American Economics Association meetings,
Chicago, January.
[11] Grossman, G.M., and Helpman, E. (1991) Innovation and Growth in the
Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[12] Howitt, P. (1999) “Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R&D
Inputs Growing.” Journal of Political Economy, 107: 715-730.
[13] Howitt, P. (2000) “Endogenous growth and Cross Country Income Diﬀer-
ences.” American Economic Review, 90: 829-846.
[14] Jones, C. (1995) “R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth.” Journal of
Political Economy, 103: 759-784.
[15] Jones C. (2005) Growth and Ideas, in Aghion P. and Durlauf S. N. eds.
Handbook of Economic Growth, North-Holland.
[16] Leyden D.P., Link A.N. (1991) “Why are government and private R&D
complements?” Applied Economics 23, 1673-1681.
[17] Levy D.M., (1990) “Estimating the impact of government R&D” Economic
Letters 32, 169-173.
26[18] McMillan S. G., Narin F., Deeds D. L. (2000) “An Analysis of the Critical
Role of Public Science in Innovation: the case of Biotechnology.” Research
Policy 29, 1-8.
[19] Merton, R.K. (1973) The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and empirical
Investigations. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[20] Narin F., Hamilton K. S., Olivastro D. (1997) “The Increasing Linkage
Between U.S. Technology and Public Science.” Research Policy 26, 317-
330.
[21] OECD (2002) Benchmarking Science-Industry Relationship. OECD, Paris.
[22] O’Donoghue T. (1998) “A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Inno-
vation” Rand Journal of Economics 29, 654-679.
[23] O’Donoghue T., and Zweimuller J. (2004) “Patents in a Model of Endoge-
nous Growth” Journal of Economic Growth 9, 81-123.
[24] Schumpeter, J. A. (1934) The Theory of Economic Development. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[25] Schumpeter, J. A. (1939) Business Cycles. A Theoretical, Historical and
Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: Mc Graw Hill.
[26] Segerstrom, P. (1998). “Endogenous Growth Without Scale Eﬀects.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 88, 1290-1310.
[27] Von Tunzelmann N., Martin, B. (1998) “Public vs. private funding of R&D
and rates of growth: 1963-1995” Working Paper, Science Policy Research
Unit, University of Sussex.
27Département des Sciences Économiques
de l'Université catholique de Louvain
Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales
Place Montesquieu, 3
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique
 ISSN 1379-244X         D/2007/3082/015